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An initiative of KZN's White Collar Crime Task Group, the SAPS's KZN Commercial Crime Branch and J Blindell.


The incidence of crime in South Africa continues to assume epidemic proportions. While all crime gives rise to concern, it is particularly those crimes involving dishonesty which are really eating away at the very fabric of business and government ethics and which are threatening the foundations upon which our economic system is built.
Although the classification that we are discussing would include common theft, the area of particular concern is that which is commonly known as "white collar crime". This is a very broad category but in essence we are talking about fraud, bribery and corruption. We are concerned with those crimes of commission and omission which are both actual and intended. It is a fact, that in white collar crime, the potential rewards are greater, the risk of detection is lower, successful prosecution is more difficult and finally, in the main, the penalties are less severe. These are all sound "business" reasons for both local criminals and large international crime syndicates to put their efforts into this type of crime.

This internet site will try to help people understand and recognise white collar crime and teach them what to do to help put an end to it. It is a joint project between the South African Police Service's KwaZulu Natal Commercial Crime Branch, KwaZulu Natal's White Collar Crime Task Group and J Blindell. It will provide advice on various related topics, details of white collar crime criminals as well as providing details of the current "scams" used by fraudsters and publicise recent successes of the SAPS.



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BHP calls for more transparency

BHP calls for more transparency

Melbourne - BHP Billiton on Sunday called for more transparent iron ore pricing, saying it would help prevent situations such as the arrest of Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu in China.

BHP's chief financial officer Alex Vanselow said the world's largest miner believed iron ore should be a traded commodity, rather than having prices set annually in negotiations between suppliers and major buyers such as China.

The negotiations have been complicated this year by Australian passport holder Stern Hu's arrest in Shanghai amid a crackdown in China on alleged corruption in the iron ore market.

Hu, Rio's lead iron ore negotiator in China, was detained in Shanghai on July 5 with three Chinese colleagues and faces allegations of stealing trade secrets and bribery in relation to the iron ore talks.

Vanslow said buying and selling iron ore on the open market, in the same way as commodities such as copper are traded, meant deals would be handled in a transparent manner.

"Transparent prices... create a situation where this type of question (the Hu case) wouldn't even be possible," he told public broadcaster ABC.

Vanslow said trading iron ore on the open market would also give investors a clearer picture how prices were moving.

"People just pull out their screens, look at the curve and they have a good idea. It should be no different for iron ore," he said.

"Iron ore ... should be a traded commodity. That's better for the supplier and it's better for the buyer as well."

Vanslow also echoed BHP chief executive Marius Kloppers' statement last week that it was "business as usual" for the resources giant in China, despite the Hu case.

"Nothing has changed for us," he said.

"We continue to sell into China and we're committed to our customers there

 

Posted by admin on Thursday 24 September 2009 - 07:38:27 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |



Corruption in Procrument

Corruption in procurement – can we manage it?

Eckhard Volker CA (SA), Managing Director, Thabani Zulu & Co Forensic Accounting Services

Procurement fraud and corruption are by far the most common forms of white collar crimes. In this article, I seek to demonstrate the close correlation between these two and also highlight how excessive corporate entertainment increases the risk of corruption and exposes you to procurement fraud.

Many years ago, I was involved in my first major fraud and corruption investigation. That was in 1995. The client was a municipality where the internal auditors had identified a series of suspicious transactions linked to the servicing of pumps for the municipality's sewage reticulation system. I investigated. My suspects were a senior Treasury officer - shall we call him Mr Smith – and the owner of a small company in a town nearby, purporting to be pump specialists. We’ll call her Mrs Naudé. I considered exactly 100 transactions to the value of R2 580 530.84.

The transactions did not make sense at all. It was clear that these transactions would not stand up to close scrutiny and my investigation progressed well. A few days later, I invited Smith to attend an interview to address my “audit queries” (we don’t call it interrogation). For the next few hours I chatted to him, trying to get him to admit to his (alleged) many improprieties relating to the matter at hand. I asked him at one stage whether he had received any money from Naudé (which could be construed as a corrupt relationship) to which he offered the very weak denial “No, I think not”. Eventually he admitted that he had received R5 000 from her, but claimed that his wife suffered from a foot ailment and that the medical aid had proven insufficient to cover the medical expenses.  He said that Naudé had graciously offered to help him out. On further quizzing I established from him that it might be possible that there was a second R5 000 (“she suffered terribly from those feet”). He did, however, let it slip that the payment may have been a thank you “for paying the accounts so quickly” (they had a wonderful relationship where a R350 000 invoice would be settled by the municipality on the same or the next day).

Needless to say, I did not stop my investigation at this point. When I considered his bank statements I found many, many R5 000 cash deposits. In fact, there were cash deposits of questionable origin aggregating R142 240 which included no less than 18 deposits of R5 000. And those were only the amounts which were deposited into the account! Later I was granted access to Naudé’s business records, including the cash book, which gormlessly listed several of these beautifully, under the caption “gifts and donations”. She had even claimed input tax against these. I also had the deposit slips where she had deposited the cash directly into his account. It was irrefutable – she (as the service provider who had been awarded the contracts by Smith) had returned the favour generously.

I felt I had established a compelling prima facie case of corruption and testified at the trial (many years later) with confidence and conviction. We had also established very compelling charges of fraud which were included in the prosecutor’s charge-sheet.

When I testify I take the comments made by the magistrate very, very seriously. The magistrate found both Smith and Naudé guilty of fraud, but to my amazement pronounced him not guilty on the corruption charges. I was traumatised! He did explain, however, that as he had already found him guilty of fraud, the money Smith received was his share of the proceeds of the fraudulent transactions and could not be construed as corruption. If he had found him guilty of corruption as well, he said it would have been a duplication of sentencing.

This case highlighted the very close correlation between corruption and procurement abuse.

Currently, corruption is covered by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, number 12 of 2004. This act supersedes the historic Corruption Act, 94 of 1992. The new act is significantly more comprehensive and seeks to close many of the loopholes of the old Act.

Section 3 of the Act contains the general offence of corruption which can be summarised as any person, who directly or indirectly accepts ... any gratification ... or gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification ... in order to act ... or by influencing another person so to act ... in a manner that amounts to the illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased ... exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions ... that amounts to the abuse of a position of authority, a breach of trust or the violation of a legal duty ... that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything, is guilty of the offence of corruption.

This could be simplified as any person accepting, alternatively any person offering gratification, as an inducement or reward, to neglect a duty or to exceed authority, is guilty of the act of corruption.

In all the cases above, reference is made to “gratification” and to “act”. Gratification is defined in Section 1 of the Act and includes items under 11 sub-headings.  These include money, cash or otherwise any donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, etc,. It also includes office, status, honour, employment, etc and finally any valuable consideration or benefit of any kind.

In the quoted sections above “to act” includes

(a) .. (not directly relevant).;

(b) performing or not adequately performing any official functions:

(c) expediting, delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of an official

(d) aiding, assisting or favouring any particular person in the transaction of any business

(e) aiding or assisting in procuring or preventing the passing of any vote or the act; business with a public body: granting of any contract or advantage in favour of any person in relation to the transaction of any business with a public body;

(f) showing any favour or disfavour to any person in performing a function as a public officer;

(g) ...or

(h) exerting any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing functions in a public body.

There are two distinct parties in corruption i.e. the corruptor (the person who pays) and the corruptee (the person who receives). Corruption could, however, be initiated by either party through offer by the corruptor or by demand of the corruptee.

In my experience, I categorise motives for corruption into different objectives i.e.:

·         To obtain an unfair advantage

·         To pave the way for procurement fraud

·         To protect against any penalty.

I will explore only the first two.

I find that the procurement function will always be targeted by fraudsters. There is just too much money in procurement. In procurement we have two parties - the buyer and the seller. The buyer has access to (or influence over) the entity's buying power and the seller has a product or a service on offer. In an arm's length transaction the buyer would act in the best interest of the organisation to find the best possible product or service required for operational reasons from a suitable supplier, for the most competitive price, but considering the procurement regulations or policies applicable to the organisation. The seller, on the other hand, wishes to get the best price for minimum effort and cost. In arm's length transactions both parties can emerge relatively happily.

The problem arises when people get greedy. The buyer (remember this is not his/her personal money) might seek a personal benefit in return for giving the seller a contract. The seller, on the other hand, might wish to have a better profit margin and may offer the buyer a personal benefit in return for "relaxing the rules a bit".

Back to my example of Smith and Naudé. In that case I could satisfy all of the legal requirements of proving corruption. I demonstrated how Smith had obtained a personal benefit (gratification) which he was not entitled to and which was not disclosed, nor authorised. I could also quantify and demonstrate how he had neglected his duties when he engaged with Naudé's company. In fact he significantly exceeded his authority and neglected his official duties when he awarded high value contracts to Naudé where the procurement policy (and governing legislation) required a more onerous tender process. I could also link payments to him to specific examples of excess or neglect. Had the magistrate not found the parties guilty of fraud, I am confident that the elements of corruption would have been satisfied and that he would have made the appropriate ruling.

Although strictly only applicable to the public sector, the Constitution of South Africa requires procurement to be fair, equitable, competitive, cost effective and transparent. These are very sensible objectives, relevant universally. If these principles were to be applied to all procurement there would be little opportunity for corruption.

Most people are inherently honest and would not respond to a blatant corrupt approach by a service provider. Imagine how you would respond if somebody were to suggest to you that you should award a contract or pass an invoice for payment in return for R100 000 cash. Is that worth it? Granted, an additional 100K is nice, very nice, but consider the downside.

Immediately you will realise that you are now a criminal. Even if nobody ever finds out, you will still know. That implies your self esteem takes a dip. There is also the stress of possibly being caught. The stress will not go away, but will increase. You will now start to fear these "tedious auditors", whom you will perceive to be a real threat to your financial future and general wellbeing. There are also very severe implications to being caught and prosecuted for fraud. On a financial side, you will lose your job and find it very difficult to get another one of the same status. You will probably have to repay the money the company lost - there goes your pension. It is also worth your while to pay for the best attorney you can (or cannot) afford. This may require a second bond which you repay over the next twenty years. Emotionally you suffer. Imagine your shame if your children no longer respect you, and the "disappointment" of your parents, spouse and siblings. You will also discover quickly how many of your friends are less sincere than you previously thought.  I haven't even mentioned the risk of going to jail and what that entails.

Although I have seen many rich fraudsters, I have not found a happy one.

Considering this, why is fraud so prevalent?

I believe that most fraudsters are "weaned" into it by a carefully calculated ploy to gradually draw them in. They are set up in a way that they do not realise it until they believe that it is too late to stop. It starts slowly with the dreaded entertainment. I see this happening in eight stages:

·         A thank you gift

·         A reward for favoured service

·         A reward for information

·         A reward for favourable consideration

·         A reward to process false claims

·         A threat to expose

·         Participation in the scheme

·         An incentive to recruit

Imagine these from a procurement perspective. A creditors lady may call a supplier to advise that a cheque is ready for collection. He arrives with a thank you gift. A small inconsequential thank you gift of say a bunch of flowers and a box of chocolates. He hands these over with a compliment saying how efficient she is and what a pleasure it was to work with her. He lets it drop that he is sure the organisation must really appreciate her and he wishes that all of them were just as effective. In truth, she has done nothing special. In fact, she is demoralised and feels unappreciated (this was carefully researched before hand). The compliment and the gift, although harmless enough, make a huge impression on her and contact has been made. From a corruption perspective there is no problem. She did not neglect her duties nor exceed her authority and the gifts are considered inconsequential.

Now she makes a special effort. To return the kindness she uses her influence to process the next transaction for payment in only seven days as opposed to the thirty days as before. Once again this is not irregular. She does, however, get recognition by means of a reward for favoured service. This is a "nice" gift which could include a pen set, a bottle of wine, maybe even invitations to dinner or to sports outings. As this is so common, no one notices or cares. The values are, after all, insignificant and everyone else does it anyway.  Once again, there is no corruption.

But then the rules change. Because contact has been made and a relationship has developed with the service provider, the latter suggests it may be time to squeeze in a favour in return. All he wants is a little harmless information, perhaps to give him a clue what his competitors have quoted. How can that hurt? The procurement officer (she has been promoted) rationalises it to herself that there is no prejudice - he will have to be the cheapest to get the job. In return, however, she accepts a gift as reward for information. Now for the first time there is an element of secrecy. The gift is more substantial and valuable but is delivered to the home and not the office. The bearer says "don't worry about it, the boss also got his. We just don't talk about it". Very relevantly, no cash changes hands. Technically, however, the offense of corruption has been committed. Gratification (in the Act) includes all forms of gifts. The procurement officer has "acted" as defined, by passing on confidential and privileged information. The seller has obtained an unfair advantage which makes this transaction less transparent and unfair.

Offer a finger and he takes the whole hand. Information is never enough. Now he asks you to help out a bit more, and is prepared to offer a reward for favourable consideration. The rules say you need three quotes. The supplier gives all three. The price is no longer market related; there is no more competition. In return, he lavishes ever larger gifts and special attention. It is important to note that there will be no suggestion of a cash payment at this time because everyone knows that a cash gift is a bribe. Although, the procurement officer argues or rationalises to the contrary, she is now involved in a fully fledged corrupt relationship. The next stage introduces the fraud.

The rules have clearly changed. The supplier will now chance his hand by submitting an invoice, but he made a little mistake with the unit of measure. The invoice value is therefore significantly higher than what it should be. For example, assuming a stationery supplier previously charged a R100 for a pack of ten pens, he now "accidentally" charges R100 per pen. The procurement officer notices, but because of the special relationship chooses to ignore it. Everyone can make a mistake, not so? A few days later, the service provider phones and says "did you see the little gift I put into your bank account"? In fact, he has made a moderate deposit of R200. The procurement officer is excited yet apprehensive and rushes out to check her bank account. She sees only R200. This disappoints, yet pleases. Disappointment because she had expected something more substantial - pleased because it is so insignificant that her integrity seems intact. Little does she know that she has now crossed the line by accepting a reward to process a false claim.

More "bad invoices" come in. The procurement officer panics and phones the supplier asking desperately what this is all about. She says she cannot process these transactions. "You can and you will" is the reply. The service provider reminds her that she was paid to do exactly the same thing last time, not to mention all those gifts. In fact, he threatens to expose her if she does not process these transactions. Panic prevails. The procurement officer feels she has no choice but to comply. She can't afford to plead for mercy with her boss and she doesn't want to resign and run, nor does she have the presence of mind to call his bluff. She realises the predicament she is in and blames everyone else. She was "set up".

Now that the integrity hurdle is out of the way, she expects to be rewarded for participation in the scheme. Although she has effectively "crossed to the other side" she is still very junior in the syndicate and only earns about 10% of the value of the false invoices. There are no more gifts and very little visible contact between her as procurement officer and the supplier. Secrecy becomes paramount. Communication is restricted to the personal cell phone. There is no more official office contact.

Big league syndicated procurement fraud requires more accomplices. Our friend is now given an incentive to recruit. The first useful service is to gather information about other (still honest) employees who could be useful to the syndicate and to identify their weaknesses. Through this process she gets promoted in the ranks and is rewarded accordingly. Arguably, she is no longer a corruptee but a fraudster.

What seemed to be such an innocent compliment and gift was in fact the first approach to test and to corrupt. Once one has reached the eighth level he or she will never fully restore his/her integrity or be truly happy again. Although you might have more money, you blow it on things which you think will make you happy again. It just does not work.

This is why I call it the "dreaded entertainment". That is where the trouble starts. Corporate entertainment has become an integral part of everyday business and it becomes difficult to differentiate between the "honest" entertainment and the type of entertainment which creates a sense of obligation. Technically, all forms of entertainment qualify as a form of gratification. It only becomes corruption if the recipients "act inappropriately" in response. Section 10 of the Corruption Act (12 of 2004) uses the concept of "unauthorized gratification".

To gauge possible motives, consider the intended purpose. It might be for market penetration (get your name and product known), appreciation (for providing a professional opportunity), enhancing communication channels (required for operational fluidity), to enhance the relationship, or the more sinister motives of having an advantage over your competitors, or as elaborated on above, to corrupt. Also consider who is the intended beneficiary and the role the person would serve in the professional relationship. I differentiate between operational level, management and the executive. If a disproportionate amount of entertainment is spent on the operational level staff, it seems more likely that there are ulterior motives. If, for example, an employee who earns R10 000 per month receives a benefit of R20 000 it would create a profound sense of obligation to return the favour, compared to an executive earning R300 000 per month who might even forget to say thank you and forget about it altogether. It must therefore be viewed in context.

Entertainment must be governed, policed, and most importantly, restricted by policy and practice. In government circles there are rules that the value of the entertainment may not exceed R350 and it must be disclosed and approved. One client of ours has a pragmatic rule: if you cannot eat it, drink it or consume it in one day, do not take it. This implies that an invitation to a golf day is acceptable but a hunting weekend is not. Accepting a bottle of whisky is okay but don't accept a case.

There are many forms of entertainment, some legitimate and others less so. I differentiate between:

·         Corporate gifts

·         Meals and other

·         An invitation to sporting events

·         Travel related entertainment

·         Non-branded gifts

A corporate gift is usually acceptable because there is full disclosure. These gifts clearly identify the sponsor as they bear a corporate logo. Although the gifts could be very expensive, transparency is assured. Corporate gifts vary from and might include a desk pad, calendar, business card holders, pens, leather folders or branded clothing.

How much does a meal cost? A meeting at a coffee shop hardly counts as entertainment but a dinner with drinks does. Business lunches are very common. A notable difference between a lunch and a dinner is that a lunch happens during office hours whereas dinner infringes on a person's private time. In the latter, the beneficiary would expect something special for giving up family time and would probably be offended if offered pizza. A dinner at a fancy restaurant with drinks is more acceptable. If there are too many drinks there is the added risk of being invited to engage in some inapt, lewd or unsavoury behaviour. Where this occurs there is a risk of blackmail should something inappropriate happen.

We all love our sports. What better way to spend a Saturday afternoon than watching your favourite sports team from the comfort of an executive suite where you are treated like someone special. It is difficult, however, to remain completely objective towards a service provider if you know that you will never have to pay for sports outings as long as you continue to use that particular service provider.

How long or how extensive is a trip in travel related entertainment? An invitation to a golf event means you are going to be back on the same day after an enjoyable outing. If invited to participate in a hunting weekend that takes much longer and costs the host so much more. You might even be invited to an international conference or, more blatantly, you and your spouse, on a sponsored international holiday. It seems clear that, for the latter, there must be some expectation in return.

Most inappropriate forms of entertainment come in the form of unbranded gifts. These could take the form of expensive pens, clothing, a case of drinks, a watch or other forms of jewellery, maybe some furniture or appliances or other gifts of greater value like a painting. Usually these are just given "in gratitude" but stating that they would be offended if the gift was not accepted. Imagine coming home to hugs and kisses from your wife, thanking you for this new double door fridge which fits in so beautifully in the kitchen and which you had no idea about. How do you tell her that it must be returned? Gift givers can be very sneaky in this regard.

Where do we draw the line and how do we know that the line has been crossed? I submit that the line has been crossed if any of the following conditions prevail:

·         When gifts and entertainment become secretive and you no longer disclose these as required;

·         When you realise that you are no longer objective in choosing your prospective service providers and you tend to favour those who entertain you more than others;

·         When you start ordering substandard (or more expensive) goods and services than those that are freely available, once again favouring those who entertain you better;

·         When procurement procedures are violated ;

·         When the relationship becomes possessive in that you insist that you may interact with the supplier;

·         When you believe that entertainment is a perk you are entitled to;

·         When cash changes hands, and finally

·         When gifts are demanded.

Most corporate entertainment remains transparent and honest. The problem is identifying which entertainment comes with a sting.

Companies are well advised to have a well communicated policy on what is acceptable and what is not. I believe that the key to such a policy would be to limit the amount of entertainment a person may accept, it may not exceed a certain value, it must be approved by someone in authority beforehand and it must be formally recorded. Auditors are well advised to consider the risks of excessive entertainment and how this could lay the foundation for corrupt relationships.

We cannot eliminate procurement fraud and corruption from our organisations. We can, however, be aware of the risk and manage it accordingly. First objective is to recognise the symptoms in time and to respond decisively. I trust this article will help you recognise some of those early red flags.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Posted by admin on Thursday 10 September 2009 - 05:16:33 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |


Phishing in China
admin on Wednesday 02 September 2009 - 17:08:36 Comments are turned off for this item


CIPRO introduces new controls

JOHANNESBURG - The Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO) has acted to try and stem the registration of a flood of fraudulent duplicate companies. In a practice note issued on Wednesday, and posted on the organisation's website, acting CEO Lungile Dukwana announced the imposition of new controls on CIPRO's name reservation process.

This action follows the publication of an exposé on Politicsweb documenting how counterfeit companies, established through CIPRO, were being used to perpetrate fraud on a massive scale in South Africa (see article). Politicsweb also published a list of 114 companies - registered over the past two years - which it believed to be counterfeit (see here).

Section C of the current Application for Reservation of Name form asks whether the proposed name is associated with "a person, corporation or company? If so, what is the name and number (if a corporation or company) and the nature of the association (e.g. member, holding / subsidiary / director etc.)."

According to the new directives this section was being "used by a number of applicants to misrepresent facts. Applicants have been found to be claiming some form of association with entities that are already registered on our database. At times, this is a deliberate duplication."

To put a stop to such abuses, the Registrar of Companies and Close Corporations, now requires "of all applicants who claim to be having an association with some entity already registered and active in our database, to present written proof of an original letter signed by the most senior officer(s) of the company on the company's letterhead as well as the certified copy of the identity document of the director(s) or a member(s), together with their application."

CIPRO has also terminated, with immediate effect, the facility for a separate name reservation process for shelf company names. This was apparently being abused by certain applicants "to obtain reservation of names identical to names already on the database except for the addition of a sequential number."

The above steps, the new directives state, are being taken to "ensure that further proliferation of these practices is curbed. Protection of the goodwill of entities that have rightful ownership to specific names is very important to CIPRO."

There has been a long standing prohibition by the Registrar of Companies against the registration of new companies with names similar to old ones. According to directives published in 1973 ‘undesirable names' included a "name which is identical to a name already registered, or so nearly resembling such a name as to be calculated to deceive or mislead the public. Only in the most exceptional circumstances will a non-generic identical name be allowed with different descriptive wording for controlled, subsidiary or associated companies."

More recently, in Practice Note no. 1 of January 2008, the Registrar of Companies stated that "any name may be allowed, provided that it does not prejudice the existing rights of any person, or that such a name is, in the opinion of the Registrar undesirable. A name will be considered undesirable if - [inter alia] it is identical or confusingly similar to a name already on the register of the Registrar [or] words pertaining to a trade mark are contained in a name."

The well known companies and organisations counterfeited by fraudsters over the past two years - through CIPRO - include: Adcock Ingram, Avusa Media, Cadac, Distillers Corporation, Eli Lilly, MacSteel, Monsanto, Sun Microsystems, the SA Guide Dogs Association, the SPCA and Trident Steel.

Posted by admin on Monday 24 August 2009 - 14:32:04 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |



CIPRO at epicentre of SA's fraud pandemic

CIPRO at epicentre of SA's fraud pandemic

James Myburgh

07 August 2009

Corrupt officials are facilitating hundreds, if not thousands, of scams

JOHANNESBURG - South Africa is currently in the midst of a fraud pandemic. At its epicentre is the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO). Over the past two years corrupt officials at CIPRO, acting with seeming impunity, have facilitated hundreds if not thousands of scams which have hit the South African Revenue Service, a number of prominent companies, and hundreds of smaller private businesses.

Two weeks ago we reported how in 2008 duplicates of Sun Microsystems South Africa Pty Ltd and SBC International Management Services were fraudulently registered as companies on CIPRO (see article). Bank accounts were set up in these counterfeit companies' names. R51m in tax refunds from SARS, due to the legitimate companies, were then diverted into the counterfeit's accounts.

An investigation has revealed that this CIPRO based scam was just the tip of the tip of the iceberg. Counterfeit companies are being fraudulently registered through CIPRO, on an ongoing daily basis, to facilitate cheque and other forms of fraud. No proper due diligence is being done. Over the past two years the directors of several prominent companies have also been fraudulently deregistered, and new directors inserted. Again, the intention is to facilitate fraud of one kind or another.

Counterfeit companies

One of the most prevalent scams involves the registration of duplicate or counterfeit companies. These are companies which almost the same name as the real company. For instance, Avusa Media is a well known media company. In terms of proper procedure CIPRO is not allowed to register companies with a similar name. However, in October 2008, officials at CIPRO fraudulently approved the reservation of the name Avusa Media (Gauteng), and shortly afterwards a company of that name was established. Its sole director is one ‘P.M. Masondo' of

Leyds Street Pretoria

.

Once the company has been registered the fraudsters - who operate using stolen identities - then attempt to establish bank accounts in the name of the counterfeit company. If the bank officials are honest and alert the real company will be contacted and the fraud nipped in the bud. But all too often an account is successfully set up. This is then used to facilitate fraud against the legitimate company, its clients and suppliers, and innocent third parties.

Clients are sometimes contacted and informed that the banking details of the real company have been changed (to that of the counterfeit.) ‘Overpayments' may be made using the counterfeit company's cheques to the legitimate company's suppliers and the fraudsters will ask for a refund.

In many cases cheques are intercepted at the South African Post Office. Companies with similar names to the recipients of the cheque are then fraudulently registered through CIPRO. Bank accounts are established in that company's name, the cheques are cashed, and the money removed. Usually, the counterfeit company uses the same name with a word (such as Gauteng) or a number (usually 01) added to the end. If need be, the fraudster can simply add the "01" to the named beneficiary on the stolen cheque, and it can then be deposited into their account.

In order to give an indication of the extent of the problem we are publishing a list of 114 duplicate companies (see here) alongside the real businesses and organisations they are trying to impersonate. We have very strong grounds for believing that almost all were established fraudulently, with the intention of perpetrating fraud. We have contacted a sample of the real companies listed. Not a single one had approved the duplicate. Some were unaware of their counterfeit version. A large proportion had been targeted successfully or unsuccessfully by fraudsters using the counterfeit company's identity.

Given our time constraints we were only able to contact a small number of the legitimate companies. However, the following confirmed they had been targeted: Schindler's Lifts, SA Guide Dogs Association, Giants Canning, Trident Steel, Johannesburg Tractor Spares, G and L Agencies, Marlboro Crane Hire, Hypersave Supermarket, Space Television, Colletts Pharmacy, The Media Shop, and AfriSave Cash and Carry.

Hijacked companies

Between 2007 and 2009 a series of well known South African companies have had their legitimate directors deregistered on the CIPRO system. New directors were inserted, probably using stolen identities. In 2007 one ‘Michael Thembinkosi Mahlaba' - in reality a tractor driver living and working near Howick, KwaZulu Natal - was inserted as the director of Hellermanntyton, Renold Crofts and MacSteel Tube and Pipe. Other companies affected by this type of fraud include Cashbuild (South Africa), The Lion Match Company, Trident Steel, Fleet Street Publications, Tedelex and Gardena (SA).

Most of these frauds were carried out using the electronic lodgement of the C29m (details of directors) form. Due to weaknesses in the system agents accessing the CIPRO database could change the names of directors of any company at will. This was done from ‘outside' but it did require insider knowledge. Despite being notified of the problem as early as October 2007 CIPRO only acted in February this year. E-lodgements of the CM29 form were temporarily suspended on February 25 2009 by then acting CEO Renier du Toit. However, this did not stop the problem completely. On April 8 2009 someone inside CIPRO deregistered the two legitimate directors of BLSA industries (the company which manufactures PoolBrite). One ‘Ndumiso Terran[ce] Mzazi' was inserted as the sole director instead.

All but two of the companies contacted said they were unaware of any consequent fraud. However, one did say that an individual, claiming to be the new owner, tried to open a bank account in the company's name. He had various company documents, correspondence with the firm's attorneys, and a certificate issued by CIPRO stating that he was the sole director of the company. A first effort in Johannesburg failed after the company was alerted by the branch concerned. But he later succeeded in opening an account in a small town and the fraudsters used the good name and reputation of the company to conduct various cheque and credit card frauds.

Some companies have been hit both by hijacking and counterfeiting scams. As noted above MacSteel had directors in a subsidiary deregistered. In July 2008 a counterfeit company called MACSTEELI TRADING was established for purposes unknown. Trident Steel meanwhile has been subjected to a sustained assault by fraudsters employing, inter alia, the following counterfeit companies: Trident Steel 22 (February 2007), Trident Sterling Tube-Manufactures (November 2007), Trident Tube Manufacturer (November 2007), Trident Steel (East) (January 2008), Trident Sterling Tube Manufacturers (Gauteng) (January 2008), Trident Steel Experts Construction and Projects (January 2009.) Trident Steel is a trademark and other companies are not allowed to use those two words in their name. This, and the company's complaints, did not stop CIPRO from waving through these names over a two year period.

Comment

Once the counterfeited (or hijacked) company has been registered and a bank account opened it becomes very difficult for the police to solve subsequent frauds. The new directors usually use forged or stolen identities. A common practice is for the fraudsters to use stolen identity documents and scan and electronically alter proof of residence documents in order to meet FICA requirements. Unless the fraudsters are caught in the act, or with the false IDs in their possession, it is almost impossible to successfully nail them. Moreover, those caught are usually just runners. They would often rather go to prison for a few years than put their families at risk by fingering the syndicate bosses masterminding the scams (often Pakistanis and Nigerians).

In a written response to a query from Politicsweb CIPRO CEO Keith Sendwe said he was aware of the basic points we raised. The organisation, he said, was "pulling out all stops to prevent fraudulent activities taking place." His full reply to our questions can be found here.

In their reply Standard Bank stated: "Although we are aware of the extent of the problem of cheque interception and fraud and of accounts being opened fraudulently and in some cases with similar names to registered entities, we have not confirmed that this is as a result of alleged corruption in CIPRO, nor that legitimate details are or have been altered at CIPRO. We are not able to comment on allegations which are clearly being made against CIPRO."

Nedbank, First National Bank, ABSA and the Department of Trade and Industry had not responded to our requests for comment by the time of publication.

 

 

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Stop Press

STOP PRESS

The criminal known as the "competition lady" was sentenced on Friday to 15 years, 5 years suspended. (This is a record for card cloning). Well done to the SAPS Commercial Branch Team involved.

Posted by admin on Monday 27 July 2009 - 06:08:23 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |



SARS Confirms Fraud

SARS confirms fraud

Monique Vanek and James Myburgh

 

'Internal collusion' suspected in diversion of R51m to counterfeit companies

 

JOHANNESBURG - The South African Revenue Service (SARS) on Friday confirmed it had been hit by a massive scam costing R51m (see article).

In an e-mailed statement SARS said: "With regards to your enquiry SARS confirms that fraud has been committed and that R51m involving two companies has been paid into a different account.

"We have been investigating the matter since January 2009 when our warning systems indentified the risk. We immediately handed the matter to the SAPS. SARS' investigations is focussing on internal collusion and we have already suspended an official as part of the investigation.

"An arrest has been made and a foreign national has appeared in court on 12 June 2009. In January when SARS detected the fraud, we immediately took corrective measures on the systems and no other associated fraud or risks have been detected.  

"We must state clearly that the SARS systems are secure. It is th[r]ough our warning systems that we picked the fraud and we will pursue all that is need[ed] to deal with the matter."

VAT refunds due to these two companies were diverted to the accounts of phony duplicate companies.

According to court documents in Moneyweb's possession, the way the scam worked was as follows: Duplicates of well-known companies were set up on the CIPRO system. Bank accounts were then set up in the duplicates' names by individuals using fraudulent company and identity documents.

Members of the syndicate accessed SARS's central system. The bank account details of the legitimate companies were changed to those of the duplicates. When SARS paid out tax refunds these went to the accounts of the duplicate companies, not the real ones.

SARS has not taken this matter lying down, it has made it incredibly difficult for companies to receive VAT refunds. A special investigation unit of SARS, called the Business Intelligent Unit, has been auditing cases where the vendor is mostly in a refund position. It has also called on companies to update their banking details before paying out refunds even if the vendor's banking details have not changed.

Posted by admin on Monday 27 July 2009 - 05:56:09 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |


UK Serious fraud cases hit highest level for 21 years
admin on Tuesday 21 July 2009 - 07:40:12 Comments are turned off for this item


Titbits on credit card fraud

To all those looking to travel to South Africa during the World Cup or any other time:

I have just returned from a trip to Cape Town. The city is beautiful but unfortunately I was the victim of credit card fraud while there. It seems that housekeeping searches your room while you are away (although not in the room's safe, I had my wallet hidden at the bottom of a suitcase). If they find your cards, they scan them through a device which reads your information. Your info is then sold and duplicate cards are then manufactured with the fraudster's name on the card.
So while you have your cards in your possession, your information has been obtained an is being used.

My advice is to PLEASE keep your credit cards on you at all times. Even if left in the safe in your room, they can get in there as well. The country is beautiful and I would recommend travel but you must remember crime is a big problem here.

___________________________________________________________________-

 

Friends of mine had things stolen from their room safe in a top hotel in Cape Town (sorry, I can't remember the name) - I'd definitely recommend using the reception safe.

RE: Credit card fraud. We've had several reports from visitors being targetted in 'tourist' areas with cloning credit cards (i.e. taking away, swiping to make a copy and returning). One at a beachfront place in Camps Bay, one at big petrol station food outlet on way down to Kruger (N4). I used to work in SA card industry until recently so know that fraud rates are reasonably high and rising in SA, especially as Chip and PIN is introduced in other countries (so it migrates to the weakest points). Chip and PIN is coming to SA slowly but surely. These cards are near-impossible to clone. In the meantime, don't let it out of your sight.

Also take the normal precautions around ATM machines. Had a naive friend accept help from someone hanging around when he was having problems - clearly the guy saw his PIN, cloned his card with machine hidden in ATM slot. Must have replicated my friend's card and then withdrew a lot of cash.

Remember: if you've not given your PIN to anyone deliberately, and pick up on the fraud within one statement cycle, your bank is pretty much liable for all of this fraud (minus a small admin fee typically). They are pretty good at refunded immediately and investigating, so just report it.

 

_________________________________________________________________

 

 

The following alert was sent out by the Cape Tourguide Association (CTGA) to its members today.

Dear All

Please note that credit card skimming is an ongoing issue and that you, your friends, family and all visitors should take particular care in any restaurant or shop outlets - particularly in the V&A Waterfront (and CPT airport). At no time allow your card to be taken away to be processed. You want to see the card at all times and a machine should be
brought to you or you accompany the individual to the card machine.

Points to watch out for possible card scamming are:

1.At no time should the individual processing the card brush your card across their sleeve or breast pocket. Skimming devices are small enough to be concealed against the body.

2. If the card is dropped on the floor stop the individual
immediately and you pick up the card - another area of concealment is the thigh and when cards are dropped the person is bent over obscuring the constant vision of the card and then they 'swipe' the card against their thigh before standing upright. Obviously there are occasions when
cards can be dropped accidentally but at present it is best to play safe rather than assume!

3. If it is apparent there is a problem with your card, you clean it yourself

4. Once your card has legitimately been swiped by the
cashier/waitron, immediately take your card back into your possession. There is no actual need for the cashier to keep hold of it, other than to verify the signature (which most don't actually bother to do). If the cashier does actually request to see the signature, then you can show him/her the signature strip. At least the card will now be under
your control and this will cut down the chances of a criminal
distracting you and skimming the card.

5. The card can also be skimmed at an ATM and for this reason the banks are involved with any incident reported.

At present it is evident that overseas persons or people holding international cards are targeted as their banks will not be calling them here on a cell/blackberry but to an office/ home telephone number. This then gives the criminals more time to make transactions on the card before a colleague or family member can contact the card holder.

If you do experience an incident and 'feel' that something is not right then it is best to talk with the manager of the outlet at the time you are there. Be polite at all times and voice your concern(s) as the action of the individual could be innocent. However, if your card does get skimmed then you will need to report it to the local police station /your bank and complete a form off the SATSA website,
<
http://www.satsa.co.za/tsi></font> www.satsa.co.za/tsi - this link takes you straight to the TSI page on the SATSA website (Tourism Safety Initiative and in very small writing in the centre of the page under the contact phone numbers you will notice:

Downloads: 'Tourism Incident Report Form'.
Download, complete and send back to the contact at SATSA.
In this manner a file of incidents can be passed to SAPS to help with any ongoing/ new investigations.

Useful contact numbers for any incident in the Waterfront are as follows:

Table Bay Police Station: 021 403 1001

V&A Security Operations: 021 408 7600 (tel for the Tourist Centre but ask to be put through to Security/Contact:

Operations Manager - Thomas Hawkins
_________________________-

Posted by admin on Tuesday 21 July 2009 - 07:22:14 |Comments are turned off for this item | email to someone | printer friendly |




500 fraud charges for bookkeeper (16 Jul : 12:50) (Misc)

Go to page 1 2 [3] 4 ... 17 18 19





Look Who Got Caught

Siphiwe Eugene Mcanyana of Umlazi

Modus Operandi:

Fraud - Skimming of credit cards. Used a skimming device to down load credit card information onto a computer and then writing the information to various credit cards. Actual loss R235 206.58 (Nedbank 10.64%, FNB 32.52%, ABSA 23.11%, Standard 33.74%).

Sentence in Durban Special Commercial Crimes Court:

  • to undergo periodical imprisonment for 2000 hours
  • 3 years imprisonment wholly suspended for 5 years with conditions
  • to pay compensation of R175 000.00
  • 2 years imprisonment wholly suspended for 5 years with conditions.


Ms Vanashree Pillay (35 years) of Amanzimtoti

Modus Operandi: Fraud and corruption by the accused when she was a clerk for the Ethekwini Municipality. She assisted a employee responsible for property evaluations to alter the evaluation of properties of certain ratepayers so that they received a reduction in their yearly rates. She received corruption payments of R34 000.00 from the ratepayers concerned. Actual fraud committed was R305 507.50.

Sentence in the Durban Commercial Court on 20 Nov 08: 3 years imprisonment suspended for 5 years plus 3 years correctional supervision and 16 hours community service each month.

Ms Rowida Ramnarayan (42 years) of Ladysmith

Modus Operandi: Fraud and corruption when she was a clerk for the Department of Health. She worked in the procurement section in the Emmaus Hospital. R14 810.00 was paid to the accused in corruption to facilitate procurement of medical supplies. 1 case of fraud, 9 of corruption and 9 of money laundering (via husband).

Sentence: Fined R40 000.00 or two years imprisonment of which half suspended for 3 years.

Ms Phumzile Eunice Ngiba (44 years) of Umlazi, Durban

Modus Operandi: Used false ID documents and false particulars when she used a credit card belonging to Durban furniture business to open accounts at various chain stores in the Durban area.

Outcome:  Convicted in the Durban Magistrates Court on 7 Mar 08 of 11 counts of fraud  occasioning an actual loss of R75000.00

Sentence: 10 Years imprisonment  without the option of a fine.




   
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